What's To Be Done

Riffing off of David Ignatius' column in WaPo about negotiations with the Taliban, Spencer Ackerman brainstorms about what's to be done.  Addressing what the Taliban wants coming to the table, Spencer posits:

There are concerns about all of these, and, above all, a meta-concern about the Taliban's seriousness in negotiating. Since coming back from Afghanistan, I've been experimenting with a prospective policy: bolster U.S. forces and concentrate entirely on the east, where the U.S. command has the greatest and most direct influence, and where the first-order threat -- Taliban and al-Qaeda elements -- either are, or border, or infiltrate into. This involves essentially ignoring the rest of Afghanistan, which is the biggest flaw in my argument. But anyway -- COIN the hell out of the east, as much as specific conditions allow: my interviews with Afghans in Paktia and Khost suggest to me that there's a base of support for U.S. troops provided that they're seen as actively improving the security of the populace, and delivering results. Take that opportunity for the next one to three years. In Year One, intensify calls to Taliban and affiliated elements for reconciliation with the national government (Karzai or otherwise). That way, the choice posed to the insurgency is fairly clear -- you can fight and die, or you can have a piece of the action. And you publicly announce that the prize for a thoroughgoing reconciliation with the Afghan government -- judged by whatever mechanism can be created -- is a U.S. withdrawal. The flip side to that is if the Taliban doesn't come to the table, we stay and fight.

This is above my pay grade, but I think it's a good thing that there is more thought put into strategy in Afghanistan than Hulk Crush.  It didn't work in Iraq.